I’m in the process of pulling together some privacy-related thoughts surrounding Canadian ISPs’ use of DPI equipment. I’ve posted an early draft of the document, and invite comments and thoughts. If you want to prepare your own comments, you’ve still got until February 23rd.
Other posts you might be interested in:
- Summary: CRTC PN 2008-19; Requests for Public Disclosure Filings
- Update: CRTC PN 2008-19 ISP Filing Summary Document
- Update: CRTC PN 2008-19 Filings
- Summary: CRTC PN 2008-19; ISP Traffic Managment in Canada
- Draft: What’s Driving Deep Packet Inspection in Canada?
About Christopher
Christopher is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Victoria. He is currently attending to a particular set of technologies that facilitate digitally mediated surveillance, including Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), behavioral advertising, and mobile devices. He thinks through how these technologies influence citizens in their decision to openly express themselves or engage in self-censoring behavior on a regular basis.
A broader proceeding in order to understand the complex issues raised in the CAIP application is a perfectly acceptable and responsible means of developing a thoughtful policy approach and decision on network management. What is entirely unfair and unacceptable, however, is the fact that the Commission rendered Decision 2008-108 without the benefit of a comprehensive understanding of the factual, legal and policy issues at play. In particular, if the Commission did not believe that it had an adequate evidentiary record or did not have a full understanding of the factual and legal issues raised by Bell’s throttling of wholesale GAS services to be able to determine in an unqualified and final manner the issues raised in the CAIP proceeding, then it was procedurally unfair for the Commission to have rendered a decision on CAIP’s application.